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INCENTIVES EMBEDDED IN INSTITUTIONS:
THE CASE OF SHARE CONTRACTS IN
GHANAIAN COCOA PRODUCTION
TSUTOMU TAKANE
I. INTRODUCTION
ROVISION of price incentives to farmers is usually considered essential for agri-
cultural development in Africa. An influential report of the World Bank (1981,
p. 55), for example, states that “insufficient price incentives for agricultural
producers are an important factor behind the disappointing growth of African agri-
culture.” Similar emphasis on the importance of price incentives in explaining pro-
duction outcomes can be seen in the literature on cocoa production in Ghana. The
stagnation of cocoa production in the 1970s has been attributed mostly to the low
producer prices set by the government, and the subsequent upward production trends
in the 1980s and 1990s have been explained mainly by the change of price struc-
tures associated with the structural adjustment programs (World Bank 1984, p. xx;
1991a, p. 3; 1991b, p. vi; Bateman et al. 1990; Asenso-Okyere 1990, pp. 76–80;
Armstrong 1996, p. 81). The proposition behind these studies is clear: African farmers
are responsive to price, and providing farmers with adequate price incentives is a
prerequisite for a production increase.
Although this aspect of incentive is important, regarding price as the sole ex-
planatory factor is far from satisfactory in understanding the complex realities of
agricultural production in rural Africa. By analyzing the share contracts widely
practiced in southern Ghana, the present study argues that local institutions such as
land tenure systems and agrarian contracts also provide strong incentives and disin-
centives to agricultural production. This is not to deny the importance of price in-
centives. But such incentives need to be placed in wider incentive structures em-
bedded in the complex interactions among local institutions.
An important insight made by writers on the economics of rural organization is
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that “markets interact through many channels besides prices and incomes” (Hoff,
Braverman, and Stiglitz 1993, p. 17, original emphasis). They argue that non-price
market interactions such as informal credit and informal land markets governed by
customary law are also important in understanding the actual transactions we ob-
serve in rural societies. The present study also takes this position, but with more
emphasis on sociological variables such as farmers’ life cycles.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the literature on
the role of institutions in agrarian economies, with particular emphasis on share
contracts. This is followed by a description of the fieldwork method and some char-
acteristics of study locations. A number of labor arrangements in cocoa production
are then discussed, followed by a detailed analysis of share contracts and incentive
structures embedded in them. The concluding section offers a brief summary of the
discussion.
II. INSTITUTIONS, SHARE CONTRACTS, AND COCOA PRODUCTION
An institution can be broadly defined as a set of rules and constraints which govern
the behavioral relations among individuals or groups (Nabli and Nugent 1989,
p. 1335).1 In recent years the importance of the role of institutions in understanding
the development process has become widely recognized. A large body of studies on
institutions comes from economists under the name of the “New Institutional Eco-
nomics (NIE)” (Harriss, Hunter, and Lewis 1995; Bardhan 1989), but the role of
institutions is also the main focus of analysis for political scientists (Bates 1981),
economic historians (North 1990), and anthropologists (Ensminger 1992; Acheson
1994).
An important finding derived from the above studies is that institutions play a
particularly important role in agrarian economies in which people confront imper-
fect markets. When market imperfection is prevalent, production and exchange may
be constrained by various transaction costs caused by, for example, difficulty in
contract enforcement, uncertain property rights, and imperfect and asymmetric in-
1 Other scholars offer different definitions of institutions. For example, Hoff, Braverman, and Stiglitz
(1993, p. 1) define an institution as “a public system of rules that define the kinds of exchanges that
can occur among individuals and that structure their incentives in exchange,” while Ruttan and
Hayami (1984, p. 204) state that “institutions are the rules of a society or of organizations that
facilitate coordination among people by helping them form expectations which each person can
reasonably hold in dealing with others.” As Nabli and Nugent (1989, p. 1335) argue, in the various
definitions three characteristics of institutions are explicit. They are the rules and constraints, the
ability to govern the relations among individuals and groups, and the predictability of future situa-
tions. Another important point is that an institution should be regarded not as a fixed set of rules and
constraints but as a dynamic one, changing over time as individuals and groups alter their behavior
in response to new socioeconomic circumstances (Leach, Mearns, and Scoones 1999; Kikuchi and
Hayami 1999).
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formation. Institutions in such a situation work as complements to the imperfect
markets by providing rules under which the activities of others become more pre-
dictable, thus reducing transaction costs and facilitating production and exchange.
Among various institutions in agrarian economies, share contracts have attracted
much attention in academic writing. At least three approaches to the study of share
contracts exist. First is the neoclassical economist approach in which the share
contract is analyzed from the viewpoints of efficiency, risk sharing, transaction
costs, and imperfect information. In this approach the share contract is seen as
providing a compromise between efficiency and risk in uncertain environments in
agrarian economies. Given the uncertainty and the costs of landlord monitoring of
tenants’ work, share contracts are seen as desirable despite the Marshallian ineffi-
ciency. In addition, the interlinkage of share contracts with other transactions is
seen as providing the landlord with a means of overcoming inefficiencies and of
reducing transaction costs associated with imperfect information. For example, the
interlinkage of share contracts with consumption loans to tenants can be seen as the
landlord’s means of inducing the tenant to work harder to repay the debt, thus re-
ducing the cost to the landlord of monitoring and enforcing the tenant’s work. Simi-
larly, the interlinkage with production loans can be the means of forcing the tenant
to invest and innovate, which raises the marginal productivity of effort, resulting in
both higher work incentives to tenants and greater efficiency. Thus interlinked con-
tracts are interpreted as a response to imperfect markets by landlords to achieve
greater  efficiency  (Stiglitz  1974,  1986;  Braverman  and  Stiglitz  1982;  Hoff,
Braverman, and Stiglitz 1993).2 Furthermore, when long-term interlinked contracts
are associated with intense social interaction in a community, reputation plays a
major role in contract enforcement and in added work incentives to the tenant
(Hayami and Otsuka 1993).
Marxian economists offer an entirely different view of share contracts (Bhaduri
1973, 1986; Byres 1983). For them, the share contract is a particular method of
surplus appropriation through which surplus is transferred from one class (the ten-
ants) to another (the landlords). What is important is not allocative or production
efficiency, on which neoclassical economists put so much emphasis, but “class ef-
ficiency for extracting surplus” (Bhaduri 1986, p. 268). The interlinkage of share
contracts with other transactions from this viewpoint is seen as a means of improv-
ing the effectiveness of the process of surplus extraction. Furthermore, the arrange-
ments represent inequality of access to the means of production and asymmetry of
economic power between the contracting parties, forcing tenants to involuntarily
participate in the process of exploitation. In this way, the tenants are caught in a
nexus of “forced commerce” (Bhaduri 1986, p. 268) through which advantages are
2 Otsuka, Chuma, and Hayami (1992) and Taslim (1988) provide critical assessments of this conven-
tional view.
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always given to the landholding class at the expense of landless tenants. An impor-
tant point here is that the “class efficiency” argument of Marxian economists does
not necessarily reject the validity of the neoclassical economists’ argument that the
share contract contains various means of enforcement to make the tenant work
harder to increase efficiency. Rather, such contract enforcement and the resultant
efficiency can be a way to achieve effective exploitation by the landholding class.
Therefore the exploitation hypothesis of Marxian economists and the efficiency
hypothesis of neoclassical economists “are two sides of the same coin” (Ellis 1993,
p. 159).
The third is a sociological approach in which share contracts are examined in
relation to the lives of individuals, their relative importance in factor markets, and
the economic history of a particular locality (Robertson 1980, 1982, 1987). The
effect of time is the key in this approach, because share contracts are understood as
a flexible and adaptable institution evolving over many decades, reflecting a com-
plex and long-term relationship among local people. It is also argued in this ap-
proach that share contracts are not determined exclusively by custom, nor by a
dialectical process between the two classes as Marxians suggest, nor by the short-
run strategic choices of individuals as neoclassical economists do, but by combina-
tions of all three. Furthermore, within the process involving the contract, “contract-
ing parties seek security in institutions established over time, and transact ‘futures’
in the supply of land, labour and other resources” (Robertson 1987, p. 16, emphasis
added).
Among these three approaches, the neoclassical and sociological ones have been
the main perspectives taken in the empirical studies of share contracts in Ghana. A
neoclassical perspective can be seen in the paper by Boadu (1992) in which, relying
heavily on the earlier study of Hill (1956), he argues that the difference in the levels
of risk and in transaction costs in production is the main reason for the existence of
different contracts in different regions in Ghana. Robertson (1982), on the other
hand, applies the sociological perspective and has examined Ghanaian share con-
tracts with reference to the development of individual contracts, changing domestic
circumstances of the farm owner and the farm worker, and their competing interests
on a maturing cocoa farm. He also relates the changing interests of contracting
parties and their negotiation to the macro processes of geographical expansion and
the historical development of cocoa production in Ghana.
The present study, which adopts an approach similar to that of Robertson, con-
tributes to the existing literature on share contracts in Ghana in two ways. First, by
using the data derived from fieldwork in the 1990s, it highlights some recent changes
in Ghanaian cocoa production in general and in share contracts in particular. Both
Boadu and Robertson rely heavily on data collected in the 1950s and 1960s during
which the situations surrounding cocoa production (for example, availability of
uncultivated forest land) were different from those in the 1990s. The subsequent
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changes, such as increased population and the resultant land scarcity, may have
affected farmer production strategies and contract choices. Examining the share
contracts practiced in the 1990s is important in this sense. Second, on the basis of
empirical observation made in the fieldwork, the present study classifies share con-
tracts in Ghana into two distinct types. Most literature on cocoa production in Ghana,
including the two studies mentioned above, treat share contracts under the single
category of abusa (division into three). This appears to be a serious deficiency be-
cause, as will be discussed in Sections V and VI, the contents of the two types,3 and
the resultant incentive structures embedded in them, are very different. By clarify-
ing the structure of the two distinct types practiced in the 1990s, the present study
helps provide a clearer picture of share contracts in Ghana.
III. METHOD AND STUDY LOCATIONS
The fieldwork was undertaken in three cocoa-producing villages between Septem-
ber 1995 and August 1996 (Figure 1). In selecting the study locations, efforts were
made to include areas with different historical, social, and geographical backgrounds
to reflect the different conditions of cocoa production in the country. The first study
village, Bepoase, a community with 34 compound houses, is located in Juabeso
District in the Western Region. The Western Region is a relatively new cocoa-growing
area, and Bepoase is no exception. The village is a typical migrant community in
the sense that, although it is located in the Sefwi Traditional Area, there are no
Sefwi residing in the village. The first migrants settled in Bepoase in the late 1940s,
and some of the original settlers were still active in cocoa production at the time of
the survey. The second study location, Nagore, is in Atwima District in the Ashanti
Region. There were 72 compound houses at the time of the survey. People started
inhabiting the village about 1950 at approximately the same time as Bepoase. Un-
like Bepoase’s, however, Nagore’s population is mixed, including migrants as well
as indigenous Asante (Ashanti). Most of the migrants are from other areas within
the Ashanti Region. The ethnic composition of the village is therefore fairly homo-
geneous—80 per cent Asante. The third study location, Gyaha, is yet another mi-
grant community; it is within the Akyem Kotoku Traditional Area in Birim North
District in the Eastern Region. It has 124 compound houses. The region is the old-
est cocoa-growing area in Ghana. The ethnic composition of the village is hetero-
geneous with very few indigenous Akyem inhabitants. The first migrants arrived in
Gyaha probably in the early 1900s.
Interviews with farmers were made with the assistance of at least two local resi-
dents, male and female. All interviews were attended and checked by the present
3 Much earlier, Ollennu (1962, pp. 79–83) suggested a similar classification as set forth in the present
study, but most writers on the share contract in Ghana appeared to have ignored it.
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Fig. 1. Ghana: Major Towns and Study Locations
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writer and also recorded by him. A prepared questionnaire written in the Akan
language (Twi) was used during the interviews, and free discussion was encour-
aged whenever necessary. During the first week of the survey in each study site, a
census of the village was conducted and the number of farmers was identified.4
Efforts were then made to interview all the farmers in each village. Some farmers,
however, were not available for interviews because of sickness or other reasons.
The percentage of farmers interviewed in each village was 100 per cent in Bepoase,
86 per cent in Nagore, and 93 per cent in Gyaha. The total number of farmers
interviewed was 474 (Table I).
The conventional method of interviewing “household heads” was deliberately
avoided. This is because a household in southern Ghana does not always form a
single economic unit (Abu 1983; Oppong, Okali, and Houghton 1975; Clark 1994;
Wilk 1989; Mikell 1989; Okali 1983). Husbands and wives (and sometimes their
children) often have their own separate farms, thus forming separate production
units. They do not pool their income or other household resources. The unitary
household model, which assumes pooling of household incomes and sharing of
common preferences among household members, is inadequate in conceptualizing
the household in rural southern Ghana, and perhaps in some other African societies
(Carter and Katz 1997; Guyer and Peters 1987; Evans 1991; Jones 1986; Udry
1996; Smith and Chavas 1997). Interviewing only one person (usually an eldest
male) in the household may miss important information about other economic ac-
tors within the household, resulting in a misleading conclusion about the reality of
rural life.
IV. LABOR ARRANGEMENTS IN COCOA PRODUCTION
This section describes a number of labor arrangements in cocoa production. The
aim is twofold. First, it is to provide information on labor deployment strategies of
TABLE  I
VILLAGE POPULATION AND NUMBER OF FARMERS INTERVIEWED
Bepoase 243 87 87 55 32 100
Nagore 501 176 152 90 62 86
Gyaha 852 253 235 128 107 93
Total 1, 596 516 474 273 201 92
Total Male Female
Number of Farmers
InterviewedTotalNumber of
Farmers
Percentage of
Farmers
Interviewed
Village Population
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4 The term “farmers” in this study refers to those who operate farmland or gardens, including ten-
ants, but not including agricultural laborers.
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farmers, which helps in understanding the variety of agrarian contracts and institu-
tions in Ghana. Second, it highlights the characteristics of labor contracts that are
very different from those of share contracts described in the next section.
The types of labor used in cocoa farming can be classified into four categories:
family labor, hired labor, communal labor, and labor exchange groups (nnoboa).
Among these four types, family labor, especially that of spouses and offspring,
constitutes the most important source of farm labor. Both male and female labor are
used in all farm tasks, but the most strength-demanding tasks, such as initial clear-
ing and tree-felling, tend to be done by males; female farmers are likely to use their
husbands’ labor for these tasks, while husbands use their own. Unmarried young
farmers, who have no access to their spouses’ or parents’ labor, appear to use their
own labor for most farm tasks.
The types of hired labor used in the study villages are daily wage labor, task-
contracted labor, and annual labor.5 Daily wage labor and task-contracted labor are
frequently used for labor- and strength-demanding tasks such as preparing new
farms and weeding. Although payment for task-contracted labor is subject to nego-
tiation between farm owners and laborers, standard charges according to an indig-
enous measurement called ahama (rope) usually exist. Daily wage labor is used for
all types of farm work; the wages vary depending on the type of work. Annual
laborers are paid annually, and the employer provides shelter, farming tools, clothes,
and medical care for the laborers. Because daily necessities are provided by em-
ployers, arrangements for annual labor contracts provide a favorable condition for
new immigrant laborers who have no capital or relatives in the village. Amounts
paid to annual laborers, however, are far less than those paid to laborers in other
types of labor contracts. Therefore annual labor contracts rarely last more than a
few years; most laborers enter other labor arrangements in which they are better
paid.
Communal labor is a system of labor exchange in which farmers work on other
farms on an ad hoc basis. The communal labor used in cocoa farming is highly
task-specific. In most cases it is used for the tasks of breaking cocoa pods and
carrying fermented cocoa to drying places. The number of participants varies (ap-
proximately from five to thirty) depending on the amount of cocoa harvested on the
farm. The time required for each task is less than a day. No payment is provided to
the participants, but food, and sometimes drink, is served after the work. Commu-
nal labor is loosely organized; there is no strict “membership” for the labor ex-
change.
In contrast to the loosely organized communal labor, the structure of labor ex-
change groups, nnoboa, is tight. The groups have clear memberships, usually two
5 Hill (1956, 1963) reports another type of labor called nkotokuano where a worker is paid a fixed
sum for each load of cocoa he harvests. This type of labor was not found in the three villages
surveyed in the present study.
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to five people, and labor is exchanged on a rotating basis.6 The labor is used for all
types of farm work, but most commonly for weeding. Although no payment is
made for the labor, food is often served by the farm owner. Gender and age play
important roles in the structure of nnoboa groups. There is a strong tendency for
men and women to form separate nnoboa groups. This is probably because physi-
cal strength is different between male and female, and the labor exchange becomes
unequal if the members are gender-mixed. In addition, younger people appear to be
more likely than their older counterparts to form nnoboa groups. This perhaps stems
from the fact that younger farmers have both less capital to use hired labor and less
access to family labor, and thus supplement these with the labor of nnoboa groups.
V. TWO TYPES OF SHARE CONTRACTS
Share contracts are widely practiced in cocoa farming in all three villages studied
(Table II). Most literature on share contracts in Ghana treats them under the single
category of abusa (division into three). In the study locations, however, two distinct
types of share contracts are found and the contents of the two are very different.
This section describes the two types of share contracts in detail.
A. Nhwesoo
In the first type of share contracts, often called nhwesoo (caretaking [of farms]),7
tenants manage already-established cocoa farms and in return get a share of the
profit derived from the cocoa harvest (Case 1). Tenants are responsible for the weed-
ing, spraying, and harvesting of cocoa. If the tenants employ farm laborers for these
tasks, it is the tenants’ responsibility to pay for the laborers. If the farm owner asks
the tenant to do farm tasks other than the aforementioned ones (such as establishing
6 The difference between communal labor and nnoboa described here is similar to what Swindell
(1985, pp. 130–32) called “festive labour” and “exchange labour.”
7 Some farmers refer to this contract as abusa or abehyem.
TABLE  II
NUMBER OF SHARE TENANTS
Nhwesoo Yemayenkye
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Bepoase (N = 87) 17 20 17 20
Nagore (N = 152) 39 26 44 29
Gyaha (N = 235) 23 10 127 54
Total (N = 474) 79 17 188 40
Note: N denotes the number of farmers interviewed.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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new farms), the tenant is remunerated for the additional work. Sharing arrange-
ments of the profit between farm owners and tenants are usually abusa, in which
the tenants take one-third. When the contracting parties are related (for example, a
father and his son, or a wife and her husband), the sharing arrangements are often
abunu (division into two). There is no fixed pattern of cost sharing of farm inputs
between farm owners and tenants.
The majority of farm owners in nhwesoo contracts are own-account farmers and
reside in or near the study villages. If this is the case, decisions on farm manage-
ment (for example, when to weed and spray insecticides) are mostly taken by farm
owners, and the tenants’ work is closely supervised. Decisions on the selling of
cocoa (the selection of buying centers and means of payment—cash or check) are
also made by farm owners. The tenants do not usually have their own “farmer books,”
in which records of cocoa sales are kept. The small proportion of management
decisions on the tenants’ side makes nhwesoo little distinguishable from the perma-
nent labor contract in which a worker is remunerated by the share of output (Otsuka,
Chuma, and Hayami 1992, p. 1966).
For nhwesoo, no written agreement of the contract is prepared. The contracts
cease when either party so desires or the tenant dies, and the use-right of land is not
inherited by the deceased’s relatives. The majority of nhwesoo contracts at the time
of the survey lasted for one to six years, but some (21 per cent) of the contracts
lasted more than ten years.
B. Yemayenkye
In the second type of share contracts, called yemayenkye (do and let us share),8
tenants are responsible for all the farm tasks (clearing land, establishing cocoa farms,
weeding, spraying, and harvesting), and in return receive a half share9 of the cocoa
harvest (Case 2). A critical difference between nhwesoo and yemayenkye is that in
nhwesoo a landlord establishes cocoa farms either with his/her own labor or by
employing hired laborers before handing over the established farms to tenants, while
in yemayenkye a tenant establishes cocoa farms with his/her own labor and ex-
penses. This means that the tenant in nhwesoo obtains a share of the cocoa harvest
from the first year of the contract, while the tenant in yemayenkye has to wait for
several years (until trees start bearing fruit) before obtaining a share of the cocoa
8 Some farmers call this contract abunu (division into two).
9 In Gyaha, however, some of the yemayenkye contracts concluded in early years were triplet divi-
sion (abusa) in which tenants take two parts. Field (1948, pp. 75–76) reports that in Abenase (a
town near Gyaha) the sharing arrangement between landlords and tenants were triplet division in
which tenants took two parts. Ollennu (1962, pp. 79–83) also reports that when a tenant establishes
a cocoa farm his share is two-thirds, while on an already-established farm he obtains a half share.
These accounts seem to indicate that sharing arrangements have been shifting during the past forty
years or so in favor of the landlords. This might be a result of increasing scarcity of land and the
resultant stronger bargaining power on the landlords’ side (Amanor 2000, p. 28).
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harvest. In yemayenkye the landlords often give instructions on which variety of
cocoa to be planted and how often the farm should be sprayed. However, other
decisions on farm management are left to the tenants. In addition, most tenants in
yemayenkye have their own “farmer books” and make their own decisions on sales
of cocoa. Costs of farm inputs, including labor costs, are borne by the tenants, but
in some cases the landlords bear the cost of spraying. The contracting parties often
prepare written agreements of the contracts.
Two important variations of yemayenkye exist concerning what is to be shared
between landlords and tenants. The first variation is that, after the cocoa farm is
established by the tenant, the cocoa trees on the farm, rather than the cocoa harvest,
are divided into two equal parts, and each part is independently managed by the
landlord and the tenant (Case 3). The second variation is that, from the very begin-
ning of the contract or during the course of establishing the farm, the contracting
parties agree to share the land when the establishment of the farm is completed and
the cocoa trees mature (Case 4). The difference between the two variations is that in
the first the land will be returned to the original landlord if all the trees die or the
tenant abandons the farm, while in the second variation, once the land is divided,
the original landlord has no right to reclaim the part of the land transferred to the
tenant. In both cases, landlords and tenants share the cocoa harvest in an agreed
proportion until the trees or the lands are divided.
The land-dividing yemayenkye mentioned above is less popular in Gyaha than in
Bepoase and Nagore. This is probably caused by the different socioeconomic situ-
ations of the three villages. Bepoase and Nagore are located in a relatively new
cocoa-growing area in which the first migrants settled in the 1940s and 1950s. On
the other hand, Gyaha is located in the oldest cocoa-growing area where migrants
started producing cocoa in the beginning of the twentieth century. Given the longer
history of cocoa production and the resultant division of land among kin members
through inheritance and gift over generations, the individual landholdings are smaller
and the uncultivated land scarcer in Gyaha than in other two villages. This makes
the landlords in Gyaha reluctant to alienate the land through land-dividing
yemayenkye.10
In yemayenkye, it is often the case that the contents of the contract are not clearly
agreed at the outset by landlords and tenants. In some cases the landlord simply
orders the tenant to start establishing the farm, and decisions on what is to be shared
(harvests, trees, or land) and when are left to future negotiations. As a result, there
are some cases in which landlords and tenants have different understandings of the
outcome of the contracts (Case 5). This ambiguity has two implications. One is that
it may increase the possibility of future disputes between the contracting parties.
10 As can be seen in Table IV, there are more landless tenants in Gyaha than in the other two villages.
This also seems to be a result of the longer history of cocoa production and the resultant land
scarcity in Gyaha.
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Another is that it gives both landlords and tenants some degree of flexibility, allow-
ing them to modify the contents of yemayenkye to be more favorable to them. For
example, an absentee landolord who lacks information on the ability of a tenant
may want to assess the quality of the tenant’s work before making final arrange-
ments, thus avoiding “adverse selection.” A tenant, on the other hand, may want to
postpone the final decision until he establishes the cocoa farm, because an already-
established farm gives the tenant a degree of security of use-right on the land. The
ambiguity in the outcome of yemayenkye thus constitutes both uncertainty and
flexibility.
Empirical literature on share contracts in Asia reports that the contracts are often
interlinked with credit and insurance contracts, which are often supported by pa-
tron-client ties between contracting parties. A landlord sometimes advances credits
for his tenant or insures him against unexpected hazards by reducing rent, and the
tenant in return provides loyal service to the landlord in many activities. Based on
mutual trust and reciprocity, the interlinked contracts between the same parties con-
tinue for a long period, thus reducing a variety of transaction costs (Hayami and
Otsuka 1993, pp. 16–18; Kikuchi and Hayami 1999, p. 380). Such interlinkage and
patron-client ties are less remarkable in share contracts in Ghana. During the sur-
vey no case was found in which tenants obtained credit or advances from landlords.
When necessary, tenants seek such assistance from relatives or from purchasing
clerks in cocoa-buying companies. In both nhwesoo and yemayenkye, tenants do
not provide additional services to landlords unless they are remunerated for the
work (Case 1). When landlord supervision is weak, as in many cases of yemayenkye,
underreporting of the harvest is common, and mutual trust between the contracting
parties is not established.
C. Relatives and Class
As can be seen in Table III, a number of share contracts are made between rela-
tives or between husbands and wives. In such cases, mutual trust between the con-
tracting parties may be stronger and various transaction costs can also be reduced
(Sadoulet, Janvry, and Fukui 1997). On the other hand, as Robertson (1982, p. 468)
suggests, nhwesoo and yemayenkye concluded between relatives or spouses may be
better understood as a preliminary step toward inheritance of the farm or land than
merely as an economic contract.
In Ghanaian share contracts, landlord and tenant are not clearly differentiated
and cannot be regarded as distinct “classes.” As Table IV shows, some landholding
farmers lease out land for share contracts while others lease in. Still others simulta-
neously lease out parts of their land, cultivate parts of it by themselves, and lease in
land from others (Case 6). It is clear that those who lease in land under share con-
tracts do not form a distinct class of landless tenants. Furthermore, as will be dis-
cussed below, tenants who are currently landless may become landholding farmers
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in the future through yemayenkye. Landlord and tenant are therefore neither cat-
egorically distinct nor unchangeable over time. In addition, landlords and landless
tenants are not necessarily identical to rich and poor, respectively. In Bepoase I
encountered one landless tenant who manages large cocoa farms under nhwesoo
and yemayenkye from which he harvests over a ton of cocoa. When “wealth rank-
ing” of the villagers (Grandin 1988) was conducted, he was classified as one of the
richest in the village. On the other hand, there are some widowed old female “land-
lords” who inherited small plots of cocoa farms from their deceased husbands. Due
to their physical weakness and lack of labor in their households, they often have no
choice but to enter nhwesoo to obtain necessary labor. Thus for such old women,
TABLE  IV
CLASSIFICATION OF FARMERS BY TENANCY STATUS
Bepoase (N = 87) 7 (8) 33 (38) 13 (15) 5 (6) 14 (16) 15 (17)
Nagore (N = 152) 27 (18) 29 (19) 22 (15) 4 (3) 46 (30) 24 (16)
Gyaha (N = 235) 15 (6) 26 (11) 25 (11) 6 (3) 112 (48) 51 (22)
Total (N = 474) 49 (10) 88 (19) 60 (13) 15 (3) 172 (36) 90 (19)
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentage.
* Other tenants include fixed-rent tenants in food production, share tenants in orange or palm
production, and tenants with other various arrangements.
Landholding Landless
Village Cultivating-cum-
Tenanting
Landlords
Share
Tenants
(Cocoa)
Other
Tenants*
Cultivating
Landlords
Pure
Land-
holder-
Cultivators
Land-
holder-
Tenants
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TABLE  III
SHARE CONTRACTS WITH RELATIVES OR SPOUSES
Village Type of Contract N Cases Percentage
Bepoase Nhwesoo 24 7 29
Yemayenkye 21 8 38
Total 45 15 33
Nagore Nhwesoo 78 29 37
Yemayenkye 52 8 15
Total 130 37 28
Gyaha Nhwesoo 46 8 17
Yemayenkye 162 25 15
Total 208 33 16
Note: N denotes the total number of cases for each contract type. “Cases” indicates the num-
ber of contracts made between relatives or spouses.
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“to be labourless is as much a disadvantage in production . . . as to be landless”
(Robertson 1980, p. 420).
VI. INCENTIVES EMBEDDED IN SHARE CONTRACTS
In this section, a number of factors that provide incentives to both landlords and
tenants are discussed. Such factors include, for tenants, access to land for food
crops,  stable  use-rights,  possibilities  of  becoming  landholding  farmers,  and
underreporting of harvest. For landlords the main incentive is the flexibility that
allows them to choose contracts appropriate to their various socioeconomic situa-
tions. These incentive structures embedded in the share contracts may better eluci-
date the prevalence of share contracts in Ghanaian cocoa production than do the
“efficiency” or “class” explanations.
An important incentive for tenants to enter nhwesoo or yemayenkye is that they
can obtain use-rights of land to grow food crops. In both contracts landlords specify
the type of farm (cocoa) to be managed or established. If tenants comply with this
agreement, they are entitled to grow food crops at their own disposal on the same
land. In nhwesoo, the tenant is allowed to use a part of the farm owner’s land (usu-
ally a part adjoining the cocoa farmland managed by the tenant) to grow food crops.
In yemayenkye, the tenant enjoys the freedom to consume and sell food crops pro-
duced in the course of establishing the cocoa farm.11 Sharing obligations are usu-
ally restricted to those related to cocoa,12 and tenants enjoy a high degree of free-
dom in food production and its use. Such rights to food production cannot be ob-
tained in other labor contracts described in Section IV, making land-demanding
villagers more inclined to enter share contracts.
In yemayenkye there are a number of distinctive features that provide incentives
to tenants. The first is that the tenant’s use-right of land is stable and inheritable.
Once the cocoa farm is established, the tenant can continue farming on the land for
life, as can descendants of the original tenant. Ownership of the farm remains in the
hands of the landlord until he agrees to divide the land with tenant. However, the
contract cannot be canceled by the landlord unless the cocoa farm fall into ruin or is
abandoned by the tenant. Upon the death of an original tenant, his descendants are
entitled to inherit the use-rights of the cocoa farm (Case 7). If a landlord agrees, a
tenant, while alive, can transfer the use-right to his wife or children (Case 8). These
transferred use-rights are often put in a written agreement signed by the landlord,
the tenant, and their kin members. Because of the stable and inheritable nature of
11 When establishing new cocoa farms, food crops such as plantain and cocoyam are first planted, and
later in between the food crops cocoa is planted. This is because food crops provide young cocoa
trees with adequate shade.
12 There are a few cases in which food crops, usually maize, are subject to sharing arrangement, as in
Case 3.
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use-right under yemayenkye, many farmers refer to cocoa farms under this contract
as inheritable “property” (agyapade).
The second feature is that yemayenkye provides an opportunity for landless farmers
to become landholding farmers (Case 9). Either at the outset of the contract or after
some long-term negotiations, the tenants may reach agreement with the landlord to
share the land. The process of land transfer from landlord to tenant in this arrange-
ment is slow, and most tenants spend five to twenty years obtaining the land. How-
ever, tenants need little capital in this process. What is required is continuous labor
input by the tenant into the cocoa farm. In addition, tenants have access to means of
subsistence until the contracting parties finally divide the land: while establishing
new farms tenants are entitled to harvest food crops; when cocoa trees are mature,
they can obtain a share of the cocoa harvest.
Still another feature distinctive to yemayenkye is the underreporting by tenants of
the total harvest. Most landlords in yemayenkye are absentee landlords who come
only during the harvest season to supervise the tenants and to collect their shares.
As a result, landlord supervision of tenants in everyday farm work is weak, and
there is large leeway for tenants to “cheat” landlords. In addition, because it is the
tenants who establish the farm and make decisions on everyday farm management,
while most landlords reside far away and are not experienced farmers, the landlords
have much less information than the tenants on farm conditions and total harvest.
The difficulty of contract enforcement and the information asymmetry between the
contracting parties concerning farm conditions are thus two main factors that lead
to the widely practiced underreporting of the total harvest.
The contract-breaching behavior can be reduced in a community where villagers
are long-term settlers and people know one another well, and where information
about contract-breaching is easily transmitted to other villagers. This is because a
person’s reputation in such a community affects his future economic opportunities,
thus  reducing  the  incentive  to  breach  the  contract  (Hayami  and  Otsuka  1993,
pp. 56–58). In the three villages studied, however, reputation seems to play a less
significant role in reducing the incentive to underreport the harvest. Three factors
may explain the situation. First, all the study villages are migrant communities, the
composition of village population is multiethnic, and the population is highly mo-
bile.13 In such a situation village structures are not tight, and reputation plays only a
limited role in reducing contract-breaching. Second, information about the total
harvest of cocoa can easily be restricted to the tenant. As a result villagers cannot
accurately know the total cocoa harvest and the extent of contract-breaching by the
tenant. Third, as most landlords are absentees and have little interaction with vil-
lagers, there is no incentive for villagers to report breaching behavior to the land-
lords.
13 Among those who are fifteen years old or over in the study villages, 74 per cent in Bepoase, 90 per
cent in Nagore, and 91 per cent in Gyaha were born outside the villages.
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As the result of widely practiced underreporting, yemayenkye constitutes a unique
combination of production incentive and risk sharing that is somewhere between
the share contract and the fixed-rent tenancy contract. Because a landlord does not
have accurate information on the total harvest, a tenant can reduce the landlord’s
share below the level agreed in the contract. This means that the production incen-
tive to the tenant may be stronger than that in the share contract because, after the
tenant gives the landlord an amount that satisfies the landlord, the tenant keeps all
the extra output that any additional inputs on his/her part may yield. This incentive
structure is similar to that of a fixed-rent tenancy. On the other hand, the risk shar-
ing inherent in the share contract remains the same in yemayenkye: the tenant
may reduce the amount paid to the landlord in a year of bad harvest. Therefore
yemayenkye, together with the widely practiced underreporting, provides not only a
production incentive higher than the ordinary share contract without underreporting
but also an arrangement to share its risk.
Nhwesoo and yemayenkye are closely linked with a villager’s life cycle, in that
the two types of share contracts provide an important step in a farmer’s career to
acquire a more direct interest in land (Robertson 1982). A newly arrived immigrant
who has no capital or relatives, for example, may first enter the annual labor con-
tract in which daily necessities are provided by his employer. While he serves as an
annual laborer, his employer may hand over cocoa farms to the laborer as nhwesoo,
or the laborer may find somebody who wants a yemayenkye tenant (Case 10). A
casual laborer or a nhwesoo tenant also typically tries to find better contracts (Case
11). The preferred contract from the worker’s point of view is yemayenkye, in which,
as previously discussed, the tenant’s land right is stable and various other incen-
tives are embedded. Nhwesoo comes next, because a tenant has a right to grow food
crops. Other hired labor contracts such as task-contracted and daily-wage labor are
considered inferior to the two share contracts, but in any case they provide impor-
tant income opportunities for both landless and landholding villagers. Depending
on their life cycle stage and socioeconomic background, villagers enter various
contracts. In this way the two types of share contracts provide important steps of
promotion in a farmer’s career.
A similar link between contract choice and farmer life cycle can be observed for
landlords. In migrant cocoa-farming villages, such as the three villages studied,
farmers typically migrate when young from their hometown to land-abundant for-
est areas to establish cocoa farms (Middleton 1979; Hill 1963). While developing
his career as a cocoa farmer in the village, the migrant invests most of the profit
from the farm(s) in educating his children or in building houses in his hometown.
When the farmer becomes old and physically weak, he retires to his hometown.
The two forms of share contracts provide a convenient arrangement for such retired
farmers. If the retiring farmer has mature cocoa farms, he would enter a nhwesoo
contract, from which regular income after retirement is guaranteed. In this case,
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little information asymmetry concerning farm conditions exists between the con-
tracting parties, because the retired farmer has accurate information on the cocoa
farms that were established and managed by him until retirement. Therefore, al-
though the retired farmer (the landlord) resides far away from the farm, the tenant
has little chance to underreport the total harvest. If the retiring farmer has an old
cocoa farm whose yield is declining, he may enter a yemayenkye contract in which
no labor input by the retiring farmer is required. In both cases the share contracts
provide advantageous arrangements for retiring farmers.
Besides their advantages for retiring farmers, the two contracts provide conve-
nient arrangements for landlords who have various socioeconomic backgrounds.
For example, a farmer who has established a first cocoa farm by his own labor may
want to establish a second farm. Faced with a labor shortage, the farmer may choose
to supplement his own labor by the labor of a tenant, and hand over the manage-
ment of the already-established farm to a nhwesoo tenant. Similarly, an old woman
who inherited cocoa farms from her deceased husband but has no physical strength
to work on the farms may also choose to enter a nhwesoo contract to acquire the
necessary labor.14 On the other hand, for an absentee landlord who either inherited
or purchased uncultivated land in the villages but has a full-time job in town,
yemayenkye is a likely choice because the landlord can establish new farms with no
input on his part. Thus the two types of share contracts provide flexibility to land-
lords, enabling them to choose contracts appropriate to their different socioeco-
nomic situations.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has analyzed two types of share contracts widely practiced in Ghanaian
cocoa production. Drawing on a case study of three villages, it has attempted to
explore the incentive structures embedded in this institution. The share contracts
provide both landlords and tenants with various incentives that are often related to
villagers’ life cycles. By entering either form of share contract, a tenant obtains
access to land for food crops. A yemayenkye tenant acquires a stable and inheritable
use-right of land, and may even have an opportunity to become a landholding farmer.
When landlord supervision is weak, a tenant may underreport the total harvest,
enjoying a higher production incentive and, simultaneously, a risk-sharing arrange-
ment with the landlord. On the other hand, the two types of share contract provide
landlords with flexibility, allowing them to choose contracts appropriate to their
different socioeconomic situations.
An important but far from clear-cut aspect of agrarian contracts in Ghanaian
14 Sharma and Dreze (1996, pp. 28–30) suggest that such “adjustment to labour endowments” is an
important motivation behind tenancy contracts in Palanpur, North India.
391INCENTIVES EMBEDDED IN INSTITUTIONS
cocoa production is the complex interaction between rights in trees (or farms) and
rights in land. As the cases of yemayenkye show, once the farm is established and
well-managed by a tenant, his landlord cannot easily challenge the use-right of the
tenant. Continuing investment on the farm under yemayenkye could even lead to the
transfer of land to the tenant. This means that tenant investment in cocoa, a peren-
nial tree crop yielding for some forty years, is also an act strengthening tenant land
rights. Similar patterns can be observed not only for tenants of share contracts but
for own-account farmers. This is because in Ghana as in many farming communi-
ties in Africa, the existence of multiple and overlapping interests in land is preva-
lent, and investment in tree crops may act as a means of claiming and enhancing
one’s land right (Besley 1995; Sjaastad and Bromley 1997; Okoth-Ogendo 1989;
Bruce 1988; Berry 1988; Otsuka et al. 1998). Therefore, farmers’ investment be-
havior needs to be understood in terms of both short-term incentive to increase
yield and long-term incentive to strengthen land rights.
The role of price incentive in cocoa production also needs to be reconsidered by
placing it in wider incentive structures embedded in local institutions. Because
maintaining cocoa farms is an important means of strengthening and securing farm-
ers’ land rights, a fall in the real producer price of cocoa, as happened in the 1970s
and the early 1980s, might have less effect on production behavior than is usually
assumed. For a yemayenkye tenant, neglecting the cocoa farm or cutting down co-
coa trees to replace them with more profitable crops means he loses long-term and
inheritable use-right to the land. For a landholding farmer it means the loss of vis-
ible evidence that proves his investment on the land and his entitlement to occupy
it. On the other hand, when the real producer price rises, as was the case in the late
1980s, the price incentive and other incentives embedded in local institutions may
strengthen each other, resulting in a stronger production effect than the one caused
by the price incentive alone. Furthermore, this “combined” incentive structure of
price and institution favorable to production increase may be affected by the wider
situation of increasing land scarcity. The decrease in forest land and the resultant
difficulty in obtaining unoccupied land from local chiefs, a situation not very criti-
cal some decades ago, may encourage farmers to enter share contracts using land-
lords’ uncultivated land as an alternative means of obtaining land right. This would
result both in more efficient use of otherwise uncultivated land and in production
increase. The favorable price incentive in the late 1980s might have accelerated this
process. These social and institutional aspects of incentives, and their interaction
with other “pure” economic aspects such as price incentive, all constitute wider
incentive structures that affect farmers’ behavior. The present study has been an
attempt to reveal one aspect of such incentive structures by focusing on a notable
local institution, the share contract.
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APPENDIX
EXAMPLES OF SHARE CONTRACTS
Case 1: A Female Nhwesoo Landlord
Ama,a aged seventy, owns a cocoa farm inherited from her deceased husband in
Bepoase. The farm is managed by a nhwesoo tenant whose tasks are the weeding,
spraying, and harvesting of cocoa. The sharing arrangement of the harvest is abusa
(triplet division), in which Ama takes two parts. The tenant occasionally employs
hired labor to do the farm work, paying for this himself. When spraying insecticide,
Ama is responsible for buying chemicals and hiring a machine. Ama often asks the
tenant to work on her food farms, but this additional work is remunerated sepa-
rately from the tenant’s work on the cocoa farm. Ama also provides the tenant with
a room to stay in.
Case 2: A Cocoa-Sharing Yemayenkye Contract
Kwabena is a male yemayenkye tenant in Gyaha who started his contract in 1957
with an absentee landlord. He and the landlord prepared a written agreement of the
contract in 1989. In this contract, according to the written agreement: (1) the con-
tracting parties divide the cocoa and oil palm harvests equally; (2) food crops are
divided into three parts, of which the tenant takes two; (3) the tenant is prohibited
from selling or pledging the farm; (4) the contract ceases if the tenant steals the
harvest; and (5) the land will be returned to the landlord if all the trees on the farm
die. According to Kwabena, in spite of (2) above, he can dispose of all food crops
harvested from the farm. In addition, he asserts that he and the landlord have agreed
to divide the farm into two equal parts in the future, although no written agreement
has been prepared on this.
Case 3: A Tree-Dividing Yemayenkye Contract
Boateng, aged sixty, is a male yemayenkye tenant who started his contract in
1977. He and his landlord prepared a written agreement of the contract which says
that: (1) cocoa trees on the farm will be divided into two equal parts and shared by
the contracting parties; (2) land will remain as a “bona fide property” of the land-
lord even after dividing the trees; (3) the contracting parties share the maize pro-
a All the names of the farmers have been changed to protect their anonymity.
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duced on the farm on a fifty-fifty basis, but other food crops are for the tenant; (4)
valuable trees such as mahogany on the farm should not be cut down without the
consent of the landlord; (5) the landlord can cancel the contract if the tenant aban-
dons the farm or steals the harvest; and (6) if the cocoa farm is in good condition,
the tenant’s successor can inherit the use-right of the land.
Case 4: A Land-Dividing Yemayenkye Contract
Ben and his brother Kwesi together started a yemayenkye contract as tenants in
1979 in Gyaha. After completing the establishment of the cocoa farm, the landlord
agreed in 1996 to divide the land into two equal parts, of which Ben and Kwesi
jointly took one part. Ben and Kwesi further divided their part of the land into two
equal parts, each taking one part. On dividing the land, they prepared a written
agreement with the landlord which says that the kin members of the original land-
lord have no right to claim the part of the land which is now the “bona fide prop-
erty” of Ben and Kwesi, and this also applies even if all the cocoa trees die in the
future.
Case 5: Ambiguity in Yemayenkye Contracts
Kwabena, aged forty-five, is a yemayenkye tenant who started establishing a co-
coa farm in 1977 and now divides the cocoa harvest into two equal parts with his
landlord. Kwabena told the present writer that the landlord agreed to divide the
land in the future. In a separate interview with the landlord, however, the landlord
insisted that the contract is for dividing only cocoa and that he has no intention to
divide the land with Kwabena. They prepared no written agreement of the contract.
Case 6: A Cultivating-Landlord Who Is Also a Tenant
Kwame, aged seventy-six, was one of the first settlers in Bepoase and is now a
prominent cocoa farmer in the village. He owns six cocoa farms and manages three
of them himself. Two of the other farms are managed by nhwesoo tenants, and the
remaining one by a yemayenkye tenant. Besides these farms he leases in land and is
establishing a new cocoa farm under a yemayenkye arrangement. Thus, he is simul-
taneously a landlord, an own-account farmer, and a tenant.
Case 7: Transfer of a Yemayenkye Contract by Inheritance
Owusu, aged fifty-five, is a yemayenkye tenant in Gyaha. The contract was started
by his elder brother who died in 1993. Owusu inherited the contract and is now
managing the cocoa farm established by the deceased brother. Owusu also allo-
cated the remaining uncultivated land to the children of the deceased. In this way
eight people are now working under the single yemayenkye contract, with Owusu
playing a coordinating role.
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Case 8: Transfer of a Yemayenkye Contract by Gift
Yaa, aged fifty-five, had been helping her husband (a yemayenkye tenant) in es-
tablishing a cocoa farm for some years, and in 1993 her husband gave a part of
the established farm to Yaa. On transferring the right of the farm, she and her hus-
band went to their hometown to perform a “custom” during which Yaa gave a cus-
tomary gift to her husband in front of the relatives of both sides. In this way she
formally obtained the use-right of the farm and can bequeath it to her children.
Case 9: Yemayenkye and an Opportunity to Become a Landholding Farmer
Sammuel was twenty-one years old when he came to Nagore in 1995 as a sea-
sonal hired laborer. During the first seven months he engaged in daily-wage and
task-contracted labor but soon found a landlord looking for a yemayenkye tenant. In
1996 he entered a land-dividing yemayenkye contract with the landlord and pre-
pared a written agreement. According to the agreement: (1) the tenant has to com-
plete the establishment of a new cocoa farm within six years; (2) after completion
the tenant is entitled to all cocoa harvests for the subsequent five years; (3) the
tenant sprays the farm three times a year, but the cost of purchasing insecticide is
borne by the landlord; and (4) in the eleventh year after the commencement of the
contract, the tenant and landlord will divide the land into two equal parts.
Case 10: From an Annual Laborer to a Landholding Farmer
Amadu, aged fifty-two, was born in northern Ghana and migrated to Nagore in
1958 as a farm laborer. During the first six years he worked as an annual laborer and
then entered a yemayenkye contract. In 1966 he purchased a parcel of land from a
local chief using the money he saved during the first six years in Nagore. In addi-
tion, after twelve years of yemayenkye he and his landlord divided the land into two
equal parts. Thus, a one-time landless migrant laborer is now an own-account farmer
with two parcels of land.
Case 11: From a Nhwesoo Tenant to a Yemayenkye Tenant
Patrick, aged thirty-five, got married in 1991 and now has two children. After his
marriage he stopped several nhwesoo contracts he had been doing, and started three
yemayenkye contracts with different landlords. The present writer asked him why
he stopped nhwesoo and started new yemayenkye contracts. His answer was that
because he is now married and has a wife and children he wants to leave some
property (agyapade) to them. He further explained that, although the nhwesoo he
did previously was profitable, the cocoa farm under nhwesoo cannot be inherited by
his  children.  On  the  other  hand,  the  cocoa  farm  he  is  now  establishing  under
yemayenkye is an inheritable property as long as the farm is in good condition.
